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Abstract
This speech was given by Colin James to the United
Future conference, 16 November 2002. In it he gives
a succinct account of recent New Zealand party
politics, the place of niche parties, and the position
of United Future.
Turmoil in Party Politics
This time last week I was listening to a disorganised ramble
by a former colleague of Peter Dunne’s. Pauline Gardiner
was urging on New Zealand First delegates zero tolerance
of drugs. United Future would agree.
Pauline was one of the six serving MPs, four from
National and two from Labour, who joined Peter in the
United party in 1995. Peter served in the National cabinet
in 1996. He had been a Labour party minister in 1990.
Richard Prebble, a colleague of Peter’s in that 1990
cabinet, defeated Pauline for the Wellington Central seat
in 1996. He was leading ACT. Graeme Lee, a former
National MP, led the Christian Democrats in that election.
For the 1999 election the Christian Democrats renamed
themselves Future New Zealand, which was the name
Peter gave the party he formed in 1994 before later
joining United. Peter was most put out about that
usurpation of his party’s name.
In all, in the 1996 election, Labour supplied the leaders
of four significant parties, including itself. National also
supplied the leaders of four parties, including itself and
New Zealand First. Of those eight parties only four are still
in Parliament in their original form.
There are two points in that for United Future
to ponder. One is the turmoil of party politics in the 1990s.
The other is the short shelf-life for parties that
get it wrong.
The turmoil in party politics is not over. In large part
it can be put down to MMP, which voters have still not
really got on top of, though this year’s election looked a
lot more like an MMP election than the elections in 1996
and 1999. But that is not the whole story. The turmoil
also in part reflects the disorientation of our society.
Even if FPP had stayed I think there would have been a
high probability of minority and/or coalition governments
sometime in the 1990s – just as we did under FPP in the
turbulent 1920s.
So my first point is that nothing is settled. We will
see parties coming and going, rising and falling, for a
time yet. United Future does not have some God-given
place in the sun. Nothing is predestined in politics.
Catchment Areas and the
Political Firmament
Next, I want to say something about where United Future
has come from. It has come from two different regions
in the political firmament.
One region is the centre, the space between Labour
and National.
When Peter Dunne first discussed with me his
inclination to form a new centre party back in 1994 I
said there wasn’t a space there. The centre had been the
battleground between National and Labour for more
than 60 years. The spaces for new parties were
elsewhere. And the polls and two elections proved me
right. United’s vote stayed very small.
Nevertheless, Peter claimed the centre and in this
year’s election campaign he got more widespread
recognition for his claim. The centre is now his. You
might define it now, since the infamous ‘worm’, as the
‘commonsense’ region – a Goldilocks’ place, not too
left and not too right. It is still, I think, a very small space
but I will have more to say about that later.
The second place United Future has come from is a
region which for maybe 20 years has been unrepresented
in Parliament. That is the moral conservative space.
There have been individual moral conservatives in
Parliament and National has its Christian wing outside
Parliament, but there has not been a moral conservative
party in Parliament. The Christian Coalition came
close in 1996 but ACT headed it off in the race to be
National’s ally.
The reason there is space for a moral conservative
tendency is that this country has over the past 35 years
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become very liberal on moral matters. This is in
accordance with the majority view. But a minority
remains at odds with the majority’s moral liberalism.
This minority is a catchment for a moral conservative
party. I don’t know how big the catchment is but my
guess is that it is maybe in the region of 10%.
That is a less contested region than the centre. My
guess is that the majority of United Future’s votes in July
came from that region. I would put that down partly to the
organisation and outreach of the churches that back the
Future New Zealand part of United Future.
Be that as it may, however, a catchment is merely a
pool of votes. The fact that a voter might be morally
conservative does not mean that voter will vote for a
moral conservative party. Other factors, such as the
economy or tactical considerations, might attract or drive
the voter to another party, which might even have a moral-
liberal stance. A party has to work hard to win votes in
its catchment.
To illustrate what I mean by a catchment, consider
the Greens. In one form or another, Greens have been
standing for Parliament for 30 years. The peak was in
1990 when the Green party, newly reconstituted from
the Values party, averaged 9% in the 70 seats in which
they stood and just under 7% overall. The nadir was
Values’ 0.1% in 1987 (if you don’t count the two
elections in 1993 and 1996 when the Greens were
submerged in the Alliance).
Large numbers of people have some green
tendency – maybe about pollution or recycling,
maybe about energy or nuclear power, maybe about
possums or whales, maybe about safe or organic food,
maybe about war and peace. But for the great majority
of these this green tendency is a secondary issue.
Their vote is determined by other matters, particularly
now that a greenish Labour party leads the government.
True greens, who worry daily about the biosphere or
the planet or want a blanket ban on GM or reject war
totally, number perhaps no more than 2%. In between
are people for whom green issues are pretty important
but not a life-and-death matter. That is the Greens’
catchment and it maybe totals somewhere in the 10
to 15% range. That is one-and-a-half times to twice
the Greens’ actual vote this year – and that actual
Greens’ vote would also have included some who
voted for the party on other than green grounds (such
as a demonstrative youth v oldies vote).
Now consider New Zealand First. It does have
policies across a wide range of topics. But ask most
New Zealanders what it stands for and the answer you
would get would be: to stop, or at least drastically
slow, immigration, especially of Asians.
There is definitely a catchment for an
anti-immigration party. How much, I cannot be
sure, but the 45% who told the Insight pollsters they
are against more Asian immigrants gives us one clue
and New Zealand First’s 10% vote in the election
this year gives us another. If New Zealand First is
to grow to 30%, as Winston Peters grandly postulated
last Sunday, it is going to need to broaden
public perceptions of what it stands for. Last
weekend’s convention was not a good start on that.
Anti-immigration is a niche in electoral terms.
It is a bigger niche than five years ago because
immigration has surged recently and tens of
thousands of ethnic-Chinese students throng
central Auckland – but it is a niche still. A niche by
definition is not 30%.
New Zealand First and the Greens are niche parties.
So is ACT, pushing classical liberalism of the
Enlightenment variety. So is Christian Heritage,
competing for the moral conservative vote. So was
the Alliance, arguing for a 1970s brand of socialism.
Niche parties are distinctly different from catch-all
parties. Usually a political system can accommodate
only two catch-all parties and for the moment they are
Labour and, despite its disaster in July, National.
United Future is a niche party. In fact, it is a two-
niche party, which I will come back to later. For the
moment the point I want to make is that United Future
is not a catch-all party like Labour or National. It does
not reach across a wide swathe of society and opinion.
At least, not yet.
The Success of Niche Parties
Let me now ask which party has been the most
successful niche party in elections over the past 50
years. New Zealand First, which got 13% of the vote
in 1996 and then was in coalition with National?
No. The Alliance, which got 18% of the vote in 1993
and was in coalition with Labour in the 1999-02 term?
No. The most successful niche party in elections
in the past 50 years was the Social Credit
Political League.
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In 1981 Social Credit got 21% of the vote – roughly
what National got this time and three times what
United Future got. It got only two seats for that 21%
because those were the days of FPP but it was within
a whisker of a lot more than that because the peculiar
arithmetic of FPP suddenly tips a lot of seats to a
party as it goes from about 22% to about 25%. Even
so Social Credit was crucial to the National govern-
ment getting some measures through. But in 1984 it
dropped to 8% and in 1987 dropped out of Parliament.
Social Credit’s 1981 success took half a century. It
started as an ‘educational association’ in the 1930s
pushing an idea – monetary reform – to established
parties. It gave up on them in 1954 and stood its own
candidates. Its 11% in that election led many to expect
a soaring trajectory but the league took another 12
years to get its first MP, who lasted just three years,
then another 12 to get its second MP.
Social Credit owed its success in 1978-87 principally
to three factors. One was a growing disenchantment
with the two old parties, Labour and National, which
could no longer corral the overwhelming majority of
voters as they could in 1949. But that did no more than
create an opportunity. To grasp that opportunity,
Social Credit made two crucial changes, which are the
other two factors.
The first was that from the early 1970s, when Bruce
Beetham took over as leader, it built up a branch
organisation, set in place regular money-raising
procedures (notably some very successful housie
games) and developed a competent electoral
organisation. Dead boring, all that, nuts and bolts – but
it was the foundation for a sustained campaign against
huge odds and through disappointments.
The other main ingredient in Social Credit’s success
was that it added a wide range of other policies,
including even an environment policy, to its monetary
reform idea. Some of those policies looked nearer to
National than Labour and some looked nearer Labour
than National. It was a reassuringly centrist party to
voters disgruntled with the big old combatants.
What stopped Social Credit cracking the
parliamentary code? It lacked a stable and committed
voting base beyond the tiny number of believers in its
monetary reform message. Its voters were defectors
from Labour and National. And the centre proved to
be a very unsafe place. Rising votes for Labour,
then National, during the 1980s, squashed the
squirt in the centre.
I should perhaps explain why, if Social Credit got
21% in 1981, I could nevertheless argue to Peter in
1994 that the centre was a very small space. In 1981
there were no other credible repositories of
disenchantment with National and Labour. In 1984,
when there was such an alternative, the short-lived
New Zealand party, Social Credit’s vote plunged. In
other words, a large portion of that 21% was not a
centrist vote, even though Social Credit’s policy
positioning was centrist. When both Labour and
National were firm, the true size of that space in the
centre was shown to be small.
The only way Social Credit could have held its
ground was to get bigger and squeeze out one of the
big two. That has never been done from the centre
in our system.
The only party that has graduated from a niche
party to a big ‘catch-all’ party is Labour, which in the
20 years from 1916 to 1936 came from the left flank to
supplant the Liberals, squashing them between itself
and the conservative Reform party with which
they merged.
That is no easy feat. In the 1990s the Alliance
thought it could do to Labour what Labour had done to
the Liberals: Bruce Jesson, the Alliance’s thoughtful
resident philosopher, wrote as much in a learned
British journal and some Labour notables thought
he might be right.
Jesson had overlooked the internal contradictions
the Alliance’s five distinct parties created within the
Alliance. These five parties all had different natural
constituencies and different catchments. Moreover,
even the core party, NewLabour, itself came from two
different places: one was radical socialist of a 1960s or
1970s variety; the other was traditionalist Labour,
looking to draw Labour back towards its tradition, not
preaching revolution. When the pressure went on in
government, the Alliance split.
There is another party which split under the
pressures of government. New Zealand First also
came from two different places. One was conservative,
white middle New Zealand, people who had been
scarred by economic reform and scared by Maori
militancy and Asian immigration. The other had
strong sympathies with Maori militancy.
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Political Splits are Good Fun
Which party in the current government sphere comes
from two places, as NewLabour did and New Zealand
First did? United Future.
Critics and observers are waiting to see United
Future split just like those other parties. Splits are good
fun. Unity politics is not great sport. Why has the
National party been roasting United Future MPs in the
House? Partly because Nationalists are furious that
United Future has sided with Labour. But also because
Nationalists have much to gain if United Future splits.
If it sheds votes, National can expect a goodly share.
In any case, United Future is fighting an uphill battle
just to hold the votes it got in July. Sure, there was growing
interest in United Future in June and early July. Sure, there
was the underpinning of the churches which backed the
Future New Zealand component. But that it got eight seats
and not two or three is an accident of Television New
Zealand’s ‘worm’ and the peculiar circumstances of a
peculiar election. National could not form a government,
according to the polls. Labour and the Greens had fallen
out badly. And there was widespread discomfort with the
idea that Labour-plus-Jim-Anderton might get a majority.
In other words, the negative drivers in United Future’s
vote in July were strong. The positive drivers were weak.
The task for United Future, as for all small parties before
it, is to turn that around. If United Future is to become
a durable party, its vote must come mainly from
positive drivers.
That requires United Future to do three things.
One is to organise: set up a branch structure that
reaches throughout the country, raises money, attracts
good candidates and holds its MPs to account. That is
dead boring stuff but no party succeeds long term without
it. Providence is a oncer. The rest is sweat.
The second thing United Future must do if it is to
become a durable party is to join up its two regions: the
centre and the moral conservative tradition. This is not
impossible since they are contiguous. Otherwise, United
Future would not have got together. And the current
formula seems so far to have worked: the formula is that
United Future is a liberal party in the sense that individual
MPs have a variety of views but those personal views are
not the views of the party and are subordinated to the
party’s position. But that essentially is a centrist or right-
centre position and at some point it will chafe on the
moral conservatives.
The third thing United Future must do is to work out
how to work with Labour. So far, from all I hear, it is going
well from both sides. This is not surprising: the arrangement
offers both Labour and United Future very big
opportunities if it can be made to work.
For United Future the opportunity is to build a role as
an adjunct party to Labour governments initially and
potentially parlay that into an arbitrator’s role between
Labour and National, deciding which shall govern.
For the moment that is not an issue because National
is not a contender to lead a government. In fact, a good
part of United Future’s success in July can be put down
to National’s retreat from the battle against Labour,
opening up space in the centre, mostly to the right of the
centre line, into which Peter Dunne, the centrist politician
and one-time National ally, was able to expand.
Two things follow from that.
One is the lesson Social Credit learnt: when the
elephants recover, they squash the mouse in the centre. If
National does claw back to catch-all party status of 35 to
40%, it will by definition have taken United Future votes
in the process of adding that 15 or 20% – especially since
voters who defected from National to United Future this
year are not likely to have done so to support a
Labour government as United Future is doing in
Parliament. Their tactical motive can only have been
to constrain Labour.
The obvious deduction to be made from that is that
United Future’s moral conservative region is more likely
to supply a stable source of votes than the centre region –
unless National stays weak. If National recovers, it
is likely to tip the balance in the moral conservative
region’s favour – and in so doing tip United Future
into National’s camp. In that event United Future
would be much less an arbitrator between Labour and
National than an ally of National.
So to seize its opportunity, the parliamentary team
must handle its supporting role for Labour with great skill.
Fortunately, it has time to develop that skill: National
looks very unlikely to be a serious contender to lead a
government in 2005 and, unless Labour disintegrates, the
omens for 2008 do not look too good at this stage either.
Might United Future take over National’s leading
spot on the right and become a contender to lead a
government in its own right? Social Credit couldn’t.
And, for as long as United Future is an adjunct
to Labour, it will not even take the first step down
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what would be a long march to broaden its pitch
enough to gain catch-all status.
Moreover, as an adjunct to Labour, it will be the
centrist tendency within United Future that will be
uppermost. The longer the arrangement goes on, the
more the moral conservative catchment may come
to feel once again unrepresented. Labour and the
Greens are moral-liberal parties. That is a recipe for
tension in United Future ranks and between it and
some of its supporters.
Obviously, this tension would not necessarily develop
if United Future was a supporting party of a recovered
National party: both the centrist and moral conservative
wings could fit in more easily with a catch-all party of
the right than with one of the left. But for the next three
and maybe six years, that is not an option. In cahoots
with a moral-liberal Labour party in the meantime
keeping the show together poses much bigger problems.
I think the show can be kept together if two present
conditions stay in place. One is that the Labour party, its
left and its Green party and union supporters continue to
settle for gradual and modest steps down the social
democratic and environmentalist paths on the principle
that it is better for all those groupings for Labour to be
in government than not. The other condition is that
United Future settles for modest tweaking of Labour’s
policy stances in a moral-conservative direction on the
basis that over time if it plays its cards well it will cement
its hold on a parliamentary presence. The first would
enable United Future to stay in and stay influential; the
second would allow Labour and its allies to live with
some United Future influence.
Indeed, that influence might actually be useful to
Labour. Its danger is to be seen by its suburban supporters
as a sort of latte Establishment, ‘insiders’ distant from
the suburban ‘outsiders’ predicaments and pre-
occupations amid the turmoil of rapid economic and
social change. That is part of Winston Peters’ appeal. If
United Future influences Labour to put more emphasis
on social stability, that might well help Labour strengthen
its connections with those ‘outsiders’.
My sense is that the Labour leadership, moral-
liberal though it is, has understood this and the
opportunity it brings. Moreover, the opportunity
Parliament’s current configuration offers is huge: a
long-running government that reaches over the centre-
line and locks National into a fragmented right and
perpetual impotence. That is the Swedish matrix, which
all the top members of the Labour party have studied
and envied.
So it is no surprise Labour is hugging United Future
very warmly and wants United Future to get some wins
and claim those wins – even exaggerate them. My guess
is that Labour’s hugging will continue a while yet and
will end only if United Future’s moral-conservative
wing gets too pushy and Labour’s leadership has to tend
to its activist core.
Will it come to that? I don’t know. It is far too early
for predictions in what is a new political landscape, one
I didn’t predict. What I do know is that the election result
has rekindled my interest in politics in a way I did not
expect. So I shall watch United Future with great interest.
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